Accelerating Turing machines are devices with the same computational structure as Turing machines (TM), but able to perform super-tasks. We ask whether performing super-tasks alone produces more computational power; for example, whether accelerating TM can solve the halting problem. We conclude that this is not the case. No accelerating TM solves the halting problem. The argument rests on an analysis of the reasoning that leads to Thomson's paradox. The key point is that the paradox rests on a con ation of di erent perspectives of accelerating processes. This leads to concluding that the same con ation underlies the claim that accelerating TM can solve the halting problem.
Introduction
A super-task involves carrying out inÿnitely many actions during a ÿnite interval of time. One sort of super-tasks is implicit in Zeno's paradoxes. Another is suggested by Blake [3] , Weyl [27] , and Russell [20] , who all consider the same form of temporal pattering. Weyl, for example, conceives a machine that would complete "an inÿnite sequence of distinct acts of decision within a ÿnite amount of time; say by supplying the ÿrst result after Unlike the 'ordinary' TM, accelerating TM can complete inÿnitely many steps within a ÿnite span of time. But do they have more computational power? Do they solve, for example, the halting problem? I argue that they do not. There are accelerating devices that compute the halting function, but none of those is a TM.
Accelerating TM
The notion of a TM, introduced by Turing [25] in his classic 1936 paper, is often taken to be the model of a computing machine. The details of the machine are wellknown, but a statement of Turing is useful for our forthcoming polemic:
[The machine] is only capable of a ÿnite number of conditions q 1 ; q 2 ; : : : ; q R which will be called "m-conÿgurations". The machine is supplied with a "tape": : :running through it, and divided into sections (called "squares") each capable of bearing a "symbol". At any moment there is just one square, say the r-th, bearing the symbol (r) which is "in the machine". We may call this square the "scanned square". The symbol on the scanned square may be called the "scanned symbol": : : : The possible behaviour of the machine at each moment is determined by the m-conÿguration q n and the scanned symbol (r). This pair q n ; (r) will be called the "conÿgura-tion": thus the conÿguration determines the possible behaviour of the machine: : : : If at each stage the motion of a machine: : : is completely determined by the conÿguration, we shall call the machine an "automatic machine" (or a-machine): : : : In this paper I deal only with automatic machines, and will therefore often omit the preÿx a-. (pp. 117-118).
According to this characterization, a computational process is a sequence of stages, and the machine's conÿguration-i.e., the condition of the machine, the position of the scanner and the contents of the tape-at any stage + 1 is completely determined by the machine's conÿguration at the previous stage . Similarly, we can see the process as a sequence of state-transition actions (see, e.g., [13] ), whereas 'state' is taken in a broad sense, referring to the machine's conÿguration. I will henceforth use the terms 'conÿguration' and 'state' interchangeably.
As Copeland [9, p. 282 ] observes, there is not much mentioning of time in Turing's 1936 characterization of the machines. There is a listing of the primitive operations, but no speciÿcation of their duration. The implicit assumption in the literature on computation is that there is a lower bound on duration of a primitive operation. In particular, it is assumed that a process that consists of inÿnitely many stages-in those cases when the machine never halts-requires inÿnite time. I will refer to the machines that satisfy this assumption as ordinary TM. Accelerating TM are ordinary TM save one di erence. Their sequence of stages exhibits the temporal pattering mentioned above. Copeland [9] who coined the name accelerating TM describes them as "Turing machine that perform the second primitive operation called for by the program in half the time taken to perform the ÿrst, the third in half the time taken to perform the second, and so on" (p. 283). This pattering enables the accelerating machines to complete the same sequence of actions within a ÿnite time, and so to perform super-tasks that ordinary, non-accelerating, machines cannot perform. There are, of course, many devices that can do things that no TM can compute (for a useful survey see [10] ). Even Turing [26] conceives such devices, which he calls machines with oracles, or o-machines. Accelerating TM are of special interest because they preserve the computational structure of an ordinary TM, and yet seem to perform tasks that no ordinary TM can do.
One such task is generating the inÿnite decimal expansion of : "Since a Turing machines can be programmed to compute , an accelerating Turing machines can execute each act of writing that is called for by this program before two moments of operating time have elapsed. That is to say, for every n, the accelerating machine writes down the nth digit of the decimal representation of within two moments of operating time" [9, p. 284] . Another task would be to arrive at the truth-values of open questions in mathematics such as Wittgenstein's question of whether or not there exist three consecutive 7's in the decimal representation of , or the question of whether or not Goldbach's conjecture is true [19, 9] . Consider the latter conjecture, which asserts that every even number larger than two is the sum of two primes. The accelerating machine would operate as follows: its ÿrst action is to print on the designated output square the symbol 1 (TRUE). This action requires 1 min. It then systematically and successively examines whether an even number is a sum of two primes. Simplifying matters, we could assume it takes 1 2 min to test out 4, another 1 4 min to test out 6, 1 8 min to test out 8, and so forth. If the machine ÿnds a counterexample, i.e., an even number that is not a sum of two primes, it would replace the 1 with 0 (FALSE). If it does not ÿnd one, exhausting, as it were, all natural numbers, the machine would never alter the 1 in the output square. One way or another, the machine would complete its task within 2 min, providing the truth-value of Goldbach's conjecture.
Our focus here is on accelerating TM whose task is to compute functions that cannot be computed by any ordinary TM! A classic example is the halting function H (x; y), which characterizes the halting states of the set of TM. H (x; y) returns 1 if the machine whose index is x (in some enumeration of the set of TM) halts when operating on input y, and returns 0 if the machine never halts. Turing [25] proved that no ordinary TM computes this function; no TM, that is, solves the halting problem. But here is an accelerating device that does. The device is a universal machine that operates as follows. Its ÿrst action is to print 0 in the designated output square. Operating as a universal TM, our device then mimics the actions of the xth TM operating on input y. The actions are performed in an accelerated fashion, such that after each operation our device tests whether the mimicked machine arrived at a halting state. If arrived at a halting state, the device replaces the 0 with 1 at the output square and halts. If not, the device keeps working ad inÿnitum, never replacing the 0 in the designated output square. Either way, the device would tell within 2 min whether the xth TM, operating on input y, halts or not for any given x and y. For a more detailed description of the machine, see [8, p. 31] .
There are arguments, however, against the physical and conceptual possibility of super-tasks in general and accelerating machines in particular (for a critical survey, see [18] ). On the physical side, Benacerraf and Putnam [2, p. 20] point out that super-tasks are physically impossible because relativity theory sets the velocity of light as a limit on the speed at which the machine's parts can move. This point is echoed by Gandy [13] who argues that there is a bound on the speed of signal propagation in any physical computing device. But it turns out that there are spacetime structures consistent with Einstein's equations, where super-tasks are quite easy to come by ( [19, 16, 17, 21] ; but see also [11] ). In these spacetime structures we can devise a non-accelerating o-machine that computes functions that are not TM computable, including the halting function. Yet Benacerraf and Putnam's point does apply to the accelerating machines. There must be an n, for which it is kinematically impossible to perform an action in less than 1 2 n of a minute. Even in the context of Newtonian mechanics, where the equations enable the body's velocity to increase without bound, this body would disappear from the universe. So in the best case scenario, the accelerating machine would disappear by the end of the process, leaving behind the correct results written on the memory tape alone (see also [9, p. 289 
]).
On the conceptual side, Thomson [23] argues that super-tasks are conceptually impossible or at least that "the concept of super-task has not been explained" (p. 6). We shall immediately turn to discuss the argument in length, in Section 3. Another conceptual puzzle concerns the accelerating device that computes the halting function. On the one hand, this device is, seemingly, "a Turing machine fair and square" [9, p. 295] . On the other hand, it computes a function that cannot be computed by any Turing machine. This certainly looks like "a blatant contradiction" [9, p. 295] . I return to discuss this puzzle in Section 4. My aim here is to show that the two conceptual paradoxes are linked, and that their resolution proceeds along the same lines.
Thomson's paradox
Thomson [23] argues that there are "reasons for supporting that super-tasks are not possible of performance" (p. 5). The gist of his argument is that we cannot intelligibly determine what would be the state of the system after the completion of the supertask. Thomson's main example involves a reading lamp, but it can easily be extended to accelerating machines (Thomson himself applies it to -machines). Consider an accelerating machine that produces, successively, the partial sums of the inÿnite series 1; −1; 1; −1; : : : : At the end of the ÿrst stage, which lasts 1 min, the machine prints out 1. At the second stage, lasting 1 2 min, the machine replaces the 1 by 0. At the third stage, lasting 1 4 min the machine prints 1 instead of the 0, and so forth, ad inÿnitum. In short, the machine alternates from 0 to 1 and back again unboundedly. What would be printed on the tape after 2 min, when the machine completes its super-task? Is it 1 or 0? It cannot be 1, because the machine always prints 0 immediately after. And it cannot be 0, because the machine always prints 1 immediately after. So, on the one hand, the printout after 2 min must be either 1 or 0. But, on the other, the printout can be neither 1 nor 0. What is the way out of this paradoxical situation? The assumption that there is a non-halting machine that computes the partial sums of the diverging series is surely innocent. We must therefore blame the idea of a super-task which seems to be self-contradictory, or at least has to be explained.
Thomson's argument looks neat and convincing. But, as Benacerraf [1] demonstrates, it is invalid. Thompson speciÿed the logical setup of the machine at every stage before 2 min have elapsed. Given this speciÿcation, we can tell what would be the actions of the machine during that time period, when the super-task is performed. Yet nothing follows from this speciÿcation about the state of the machine at the 2-min stage. It is like the function that is speciÿed to be continuous in the segment [0; 2), but is not speciÿed at 2. The function might preserve its continuity at 2, but might lose it as well. All values at 2 would be consistent with that speciÿcation. Likewise, the printout on the machine's tape after 2 min can be 0, 1, 17, or nothing at all. Each printout is consistent with the speciÿcation of the machine.
It is widely regarded that Benacerraf's critique is successful; even Thomson [24] later admitted that his own argument is worthless. But the critique is hardly relieving. Given how simple Benacerraf's reply is, we might wonder why Thomson's argument looked so neat and convincing in the ÿrst place; "why so many naturally conclude otherwise and as a result believe that a contradiction is straining to emerge" [12, p. 238] . Furthermore, we are still puzzled about the state of the accelerating machine after the super-task is accomplished. As Copeland [9] puts it, "Thomson's query as to what state an inÿnity machine may consistently be supposed to be in after it completes its super-task is a good one" (p. 286). It is a good query because we are still convinced that the printout on the machine's tape after 2 min depends on the prior history of the machine, even if we haven't speciÿed what the machine would do after 2 min. So we wonder what could be printed out on the tape given that the previous printouts form the diverging inÿnite sequence 1; 0; 1; 0; : : : :
I suggest that we are puzzled because we are still drawn in by a picture that conates di erent perspectives of the accelerating machine. One is the TM perspective. According to this perspective, the accelerating machine is just a TM that computes, by executing a suitable program, the partial sums of the diverging inÿnite series, and thus alternately prints 1 and 0 and back unboundedly. From that point of view, this acceleration process is an inÿnite sequence of stages, whereas the machine's conÿguration (state) at each stage is completely determined by the conÿguration of previous stage. According to a di erent perspective, which I call the physical perspective, we view the machine in terms of its physical makeup. From that perspective, the machine produces physical tokens of 1s and 0s because its dynamics, governed by the laws of physics, dictate this behavior. From this point of view, too, each state of the machine depends on the prior history of the machine, only that here the relevant history is the physical one. In particular, if the machine (or just the tape) somehow survives the acceleration process, its state at the 2-min stage is dictated by its prior physical states. 1 I would like to emphasize that we could easily replace the physical perspective by any other which asserts that the machine is in some state after accomplishing the super-task. I refer to the physical perspective both because many (see, e.g., [9, 12] ) discuss the accelerating processes from that perspective, and because it is easy to con ate the physical and TM perspectives. It is easy because, along the acceleration process, the physical device implements the TM. Similarly, we could replace the TM perspective by any other which implies that the machine is a rule-following device, namely, that each machine's state is determined by the previous one. In Thomson' s main example-with the reading lamp-the 'TM perspective' implies that each OFF-state is followed by an ON-state, and vice versa. The 'physical perspective' implies that the lamp is in some state after 2 min. Thomson 's paradox emerges when we con ate the two perspectives. Taking the physical perspective, we assert that the machine is in some state after 2 min. Taking the TM perspective, we assert that any machine's state-its conÿguration at this stage-is completely determined by the previous state. We thus conclude that the machine's conÿguration after 2min is dictated by the previous TM's conÿguration. Yet we cannot intelligibly tell what conÿguration precedes the 2-min stage. For, as Thomson convincingly shows, if it printed 1, the machine prints 0 immediately after, and if it printed 0, the machine prints 1 immediately after. We thus cannot tell what would be the printout on the tape after 2 min either. Thomson concludes that the fault is to be found in the assumption that such a machine is conceptually possible. And since the idea of a non-halting machine surely makes sense, Thomson concludes that the "talk of super-tasks is senseless" [23, p. 9] .
But the argument is awed. The aw is in taking the machine's state, at the 2nd min, to be not only a physical state, but also a Turing machine's state, whereas, the TM at that time is no longer speciÿed. The device, as a TM, completes all its actions before the 2nd min. Even if the device survives the acceleration, its physical state after 2 min is no longer a TM's state. All the inÿnitely many states of the pertinent TM were implemented at the time period prior to the 2nd min. But if the machine's state, after 2min, is not a TM's state, it need not be dictated any longer by the previous state of the TM we speciÿed. From the TM perspective, any machine's state after 2 min would be perfectly consistent with the accelerating TM that was in action during the time segment [0; 2). Inconsistency emerges nowhere.
Setting the physical and TM perspectives apart, we see that no paradox emerges. But we still wonder about the machine's physical state after 2 min, after the supertask had been accomplished. We wonder whether we can consistently retain all the following assertions about the physical setting of the machine: (1) that the machine is in some physical state after completing the super-task; (2) that each state is dictated by the prior physical history; and (3) that this physical history consists of alternating printing 1's and 0's on the tape. But as Earman and Norton [12, pp. 237-239] point out, inconsistency emerges only when we implicitly introduce another assumption, about persistence. The assumption is that the information on the machine's tape is left unchanged until the next printing operation. In particular, the printout on the designated output square would be 0 as long as it was not replaced by 1, and vice versa. This persistence property amounts to requiring that the information in the designated output square after 2 min is the limit of printouts in that square prior to the 2nd min [12, p. 238] . Assuming that, there cannot be an answer as to what would be printed on that square after 2 min, simply because there is no limit to the series consisting of the states of the tape, prior to that time. Any attempt to construct an accelerating device that successively produces 1's and 0's and that uses the persistence property must fail. "The machine must be constructed to satisfy an inconsistent speciÿcation. This is clearly impossible in any consistent physical setting" [12, p. 239] . However, we certainly cannot conclude that all other speciÿcations of super-task machines are also inconsistent. We can certainly specify, as we did in Section 2, other accelerating machines that, arguably, satisfy persistence. And we can specify an accelerating machine that alternately prints 0's and 1's, unboundedly, yet does not satisfy persistence at the 2-min stage. What would be the printout on the tape after 2 min, after the super-task is accomplished? It is certainly an interesting empirical question. But given that persistence is not satisÿed, it is no longer a puzzling one.
Computing the uncomputable
Let us now turn to the other paradox: that of accelerating TM that compute functions that no TM can compute. How are we to solve this paradox? One way out of the conundrum is to deny that such a machine computes at all. Another is to distinguish between di erent senses of computing. Thus Copeland [9] argues that the halting problem refers to computation in the internal sense, and that the accelerating TM computes the halting function only in the external sense. I do not contest these solutions but o er another instead. I urge that the same reasoning that led to Thomson's paradox-a conation between TM and physical perspectives-also creates the current paradox, and so that the same reasoning that liberated us from Thomson's paradox also applies in the current case. In particular, if we accept Benacerraf's critique of Thomson' s paradox, as we should, we must give up the idea that the machines that compute the halting function, generating the inÿnite expansion of , etc., are TM.
Consider again the accelerating device that computes the halting function. Recall how it works: it ÿrst prints 0, then simulates the acts of the nth machine receiving m as an input, and replacing the 0 by 1 just in case the simulated machine halts at some point. When the super-task is completed, after 2 min, we have at our disposal the halting status of the simulated machine. But who is computing the halting function? If we take Benacerraf's critique seriously, then the answer is that it is certainly not a TM. We did specify an accelerating TM that simulates the acts of the nth TM (for any n and m), yet all the acts of this TM take place before the 2nd min. Nothing follows from this speciÿcation about the state of the device after 2 min, when the super-task is completed. Any printout on the machine's tape after 2 min, be it 0; 1, or 17, is perfectly consistent with the halting program that the machine executed before that. If the accelerating TM does not halt, there is no point during the acceleration, at the time segment [0; 2), at which the super-task has been accomplished. And after 2 min, when the super-task has been ÿnally completed, the TM's state is no longer speciÿed.
So why do we take the device to compute the halting function? The reason, I maintain, is that we also look at the device from another, most commonly a physical, perspective. From that perspective, we assume, rightly or wrongly, that the device exists after 2 min, and we also assume, rightly or wrongly, that the device's tape persists in its current physical state as long as there is no printing operation. Taken together, we assume that the printout on the tape after 2min is the limit of the prior printouts on the tape, at the time of acceleration. And given that these printouts represent the halting state of the nth machine acting on input m, we take this limit to be no less than the (physical) representation of the solution of the halting problem.
A paradox emerges only when we con ate the TM and the physical perspectives. Taking the TM perspective, we conceive the device as an accelerating TM that executes the program described above. Taking the physical perspective, we maintain that the device is in some state after 2 min. We thus conclude that the device's state after 2 min is a TM's state that represents the value of a function that no TM can compute. We are relieved when we realize that the device's state after 2min is, at best, a physical state, and not a TM's state. We thus should conclude that if anything computes the halting function, it is the physical device, not the TM. The accelerating TM computes exactly the same function computed by a non-accelerating TM. It returns 1 if the simulated nth machine halts, and never returns a value if the nth machine never halts.
The same reasoning applies to the other accelerating machines. Assuming that Goldbach's conjecture is true, the accelerating TM will systematically check out every even number. Yet nothing about the speciÿcation of this TM dictates what would be the state of the device after 2 min. Any printout on the tape, be it 1 (TRUE) or 0 (FALSE) or nothing at all, is consistent with the speciÿed TM. No TM generates the inÿnite decimal expansion of either. The accelerating TM prints on the tape any digit of the inÿnite decimal expansion. But at no point during the acceleration the task is completed, and when the task had been accomplished, after 2 min, the device is no longer the speciÿed TM.
Of course that we can extend the TM concept so that it will encompass the 2-min stage. We can specify the value of the designated output at that moment to be the limit of the previous values that this cell has displayed. Such speciÿcation is o ered by Hamkins and Lewis [14, 15] , who introduce the concept of an inÿnite time TM. This machine preserves the static structure of an ordinary machine. Its successive steps of computation also proceed in the classical manner: "the classical procedure determines the conÿguration of the machine: : : at any stage + 1, given the conÿguration at any stage " [14, p. 526] . What is new is the behavior of the machine at the transÿnite domain. At any limit ordinal stage, "the machine is placed in the special limit state, just another of the ÿnitely many states; and the values in the cells of the tapes are updated by computing a kind of limit of the previous values that cell has displayed" [14, p. 526]. We can thus have an accelerating inÿnite time TM that computes the halting function. The machine operates like a universal machine before 2 min have elapsed. After printing 0 at the output square, it simulates the operations of the nth machine operating on input m, replacing the 0 with 1 just in case the simulated machine halts. During this period the machine behaves in the classical manner, meaning that the conÿguration of each stage is completely determined by the conÿguration of the previous stage. So far there is not much di erence from the accelerating TM described above. But there is a di erence. The inÿnite time machine also encompasses the 2-min stage. This stage is a ! 1 limit stage, in which the value at the designated output cell is the limit of the previous values in that cell, namely, displaying the halting state of the nth machine, acting on input m.
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I do not deny that this inÿnite time TM computes the halting function. I also do not mind the name inÿnite time Turing machine. Rather, my point is this. If accelerating TM have exactly the same computational structure as ordinary TM, then they compute exactly the TM computable functions. Performing super-tasks enables the accelerating machines to complete inÿnitely many steps in a ÿnite interval of time, but it does not enable to compute functions that the ordinary machines cannot compute. And if accelerating TM di er from ordinary TM in computational structure, as is the case with inÿnite time TM, then they might have more computational power. But here too, the di erence in computational power is not due to performing super-tasks alone. Performing a super-task only ensures that the computation terminates in a ÿnite real time, even if it requires inÿnitely many computation steps. The di erence in computational power owes to the di erence in computational end structure. Either way, no paradox emerges. If the accelerating TM has the same computational structure as the ordinary machine, it does not compute the halting function. And if we extend the concept of the TM, redeÿning the end structure, it should come as no surprise that the newly speciÿed TM compute functions, e.g., the halting function, that Turing's machines-the machines that Turing speciÿed-fail to compute.
